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Aurora-Core/app/core/auth.py
T
NixReaperandClaude Sonnet 5 7bee596a0e
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Add user accounts: registration, login, and JWT auth
The first authenticated-user concept in Aurora Core -- everything else in
this codebase is public, read-only catalog data. Foundation for ratings
and a watchlist (not yet built): POST /auth/register, POST /auth/login,
GET /auth/me.

Security specifics worth knowing:
- Passwords hashed with argon2 (via argon2-cffi), never stored plain or
  logged.
- Login returns an identical 401 for a nonexistent email and a wrong
  password on a real one, including matching response timing
  (burn_time_like_a_password_check) -- otherwise either the status code
  or the timing alone lets a client enumerate registered emails.
- AURORA_SECRET_KEY now actually signs JWTs (previously defined but
  unused anywhere) -- .env.example's existing token_urlsafe(48) guidance
  already produces a long enough key, just flagged its new stakes.
- Email matched case-insensitively via explicit normalization in the
  service layer, not relied on from Pydantic's EmailStr (which does not
  lowercase the local part).

12 new integration tests (register/login/me over real HTTP via the
`client` fixture) plus 10 unit tests for the hashing/JWT logic itself,
following the same-day lesson that only unit tests actually execute
locally without Postgres -- the auth core is tested for real here rather
than only through integration tests that might not run before a deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
2026-09-06 06:15:39 -05:00

76 lines
2.5 KiB
Python

"""Password hashing and JWT access tokens for registered users.
Separate from app/core/security.py, which handles admin-API-key auth and
rate limiting -- unrelated concerns (a machine-to-machine secret vs. a
human user's own credentials).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import uuid
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
import jwt
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
from app.core.config import get_settings
_hasher = PasswordHasher()
_JWT_ALGORITHM = "HS256"
ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL = timedelta(hours=24)
class InvalidTokenError(Exception):
"""Raised for any access token that's missing, malformed, expired, or
signed with a different key -- callers treat all of these identically
(401), so this collapses PyJWT's several exception types into one."""
def normalize_email(email: str) -> str:
"""Emails are matched and stored case-insensitively (RFC 5321 technically
allows a case-sensitive local part, but no mainstream provider honors
that, and forcing lowercase avoids needing a functional unique index)."""
return email.strip().lower()
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
return _hasher.hash(password)
def verify_password(password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
try:
return _hasher.verify(hashed_password, password)
except VerifyMismatchError:
return False
# Computed once at import time, verified against on a login attempt whose
# email doesn't exist at all -- so rejecting a nonexistent account takes
# roughly the same time as rejecting a wrong password on a real one.
# Without this, a login endpoint's response time itself reveals which
# emails are registered, letting an attacker enumerate accounts without
# ever guessing a password.
_DUMMY_HASH = _hasher.hash("not-a-real-password-used-only-for-timing")
def burn_time_like_a_password_check() -> None:
verify_password("irrelevant", _DUMMY_HASH)
def create_access_token(user_id: uuid.UUID) -> str:
settings = get_settings()
now = datetime.now(UTC)
payload = {"sub": str(user_id), "iat": now, "exp": now + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL}
return jwt.encode(payload, settings.AURORA_SECRET_KEY, algorithm=_JWT_ALGORITHM)
def decode_access_token(token: str) -> uuid.UUID:
settings = get_settings()
try:
payload = jwt.decode(token, settings.AURORA_SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[_JWT_ALGORITHM])
return uuid.UUID(payload["sub"])
except (jwt.InvalidTokenError, KeyError, ValueError) as exc:
raise InvalidTokenError(str(exc)) from exc